Дэвид Чалмерс - Сознающий ум. В поисках фундаментальной теории

• Название: Сознающий ум. В поисках фундаментальной теории
• Автор: Дэвид Чалмерс
• Издательство: Книжный дом «ЛИБРОКОМ»
• Жанр: Философия
• Год: 2013
• ISBN: ISBN 978-5-397-03778-5

Эта книга, впервые опубликованная в 1996 году, стала одним из самых заметных философских трактатов конца XX века. В наши дни уже не удастся найти серьезных работ по проблеме сознания, в которых не было бы ссылок на Чалмерса.

«Сознающий ум» — увлекательный философский рассказ о глубочайших парадоксах и тайнах сознания. Это провокативная работа, в которой сделана попытка обосновать «натуралистический дуализм», исходя из тезиса автора о нефизической природе сознания и его зависимости от функциональных схем в мозге. Чалмерс также утверждает, что его теория открывает новые перспективы для интерпретации квантовой механики и позволяет говорить о возможности сознательных роботов.

Ясность изложения, смелость идей, изобретательность мысленных экспериментов, точность рассуждений и широкая эрудиция автора делают эту книгу настоящим подарком для всех, кто интересуется философией.

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